// a launchpad on pump.fun · solana

Every coin is sealed with two fates.

|ψ⟩ = α|A⟩ + β|B⟩(1)

Launch a box with two committed fates. The market trades the uncertainty; graduation collapses it and one fate executes. Every holder gets a certificate of the outcome, and creator fees settle into a vault only a hash-based signature can open.

$ superpose launch read spec

bloch.view● unobserved

fig. 1 — a box before observation. P(A) = P(B) = 0.50

n_boxes

n_collapsed

vault_balance_total

0.0000 SOL

leaves_per_identity

256

§ 2 · protocol

From superposition to an outcome, in four transitions.

§ 2.1

seal(box, A, B)

One name, ticker and image, frozen at mint. Two fates written beside them and signed with a one-time hash-based key.

launchDigest → wots(leaf)

§ 2.2

trade(ψ)

One pump.fun bonding curve. Part of every fee sweep fills the collapse reserve that funds the winning fate.

pump.fun create_v2 · reserve 0.20

§ 2.3

measure() → execute()

At graduation (or the fallback deadline) quantum randomness picks |A⟩ or |B⟩ and that fate runs: burn, airdrop, unlock or a 1-hour lock.

qrng ‖ blockhash ‖ mint → bit

§ 2.4

certify(holders)

Every holder at the measurement is recorded and receives a compressed NFT certificate of the outcome.

bubblegum cNFT

collapse.rs§ 3 · nobody knows which fate runs — not even the creator

01// committed at launch

02let commit = sha256("qrng" ‖ qrng_value);

03let slot   = trigger_slot + 32;

04let seed   = sha256(qrng_value ‖ blockhash(slot) ‖ mint);

05let fate   = if seed[0] & 1 == 0 { fate_a } else { fate_b };

06execute(fate, reserve); certify(snapshot(slot));

§ 5 · observations

Boxes

boxfatesstatusreserve

// no boxes yet — launch the first one

§ 6 · threat model

assertLaunch provenance: every manifest is signed by a one-time hash-based key.

assertFair collapse: the QRNG value is committed before trading; the blockhash does not exist yet.

assertVault withdrawals require a WOTS signature, not your wallet.

unsafePhase 1 vaults are custodial: SOL sits in a platform wallet guarded by ed25519.

unsafeTokens in ordinary Solana wallets are still guarded by ed25519 alone.

unsafeWallet-only identities are as strong as the wallet. Use a passphrase.